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Proper Names and Definite Descriptions
The notion of rigid designation was first introduced by
Saul Kripke in the lectures that became
Naming and Necessity, in the course of his argument against descriptivism theories of reference. At the time of Kripke's lectures, the dominant theories of reference in Analytic philosophy (associated with the theories of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell) held that the meaning of sentences involving proper names could be given by substituting a contextually appropriate description for the name. Russell, for example, famously heldRussell, Bertrand, Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,
The Problems of Philosophy, chapter 5 ( online text.) that someone who had never met Otto von Bismarck might know of him as
the first Chancellor of the German Empire, and if so, his statement that (say) "Bismarck was a ruthless politician" should be understood to mean "The first Chancellor of the German Empire was a ruthless politician" (which could in turn be analysed into a series of more basic statements according to the method Russell introduced in his theory of
definite descriptions). Kripke argued — against both the Russellian analysis and several attempted refinements of it — that such descriptions could not possibly
mean the same thing as the name "Bismarck," on the grounds that proper names such as "Bismarck" always designate
rigidly, whereas descriptions such as "the first Chancellor of the German Empire" do not. Thus, for example, it
might have been the case that Bismarck died in infancy. If so, he would not have ever satisfied the description "the first Chancellor of the German Empire," and (indeed) someone else probably would have. It does not follow that the first Chancellor of the German Empire may not have been the first Chancellor of the German Empire—that is (at least according to its surface-structure) a contradiction. Kripke argues that the way that proper names
work is that when we make statements about what might or might not have been true of Bismarck, we are talking about what might or might not have been true of
that particular person in various situations, whereas when we make statements about what might or might not have been true of, say,
the first Chancellor of the German Empire we
could be talking about what might or might not have been true of
whomever would have happened to fill that office in those situations.
The "could" here is important to note: rigid designation is a property of the
way terms are used, not a property of
the terms themselves, and some philosophers, following
Keith Donnellan, have argued that a phrase such as "the first Chancellor of the German Empire"
could be used rigidly, in sentences such as "the first Chancellor of the German Empire could have decided never to go into politics." Kripke himself doubted that there was any need to recognize rigid uses of definite descriptions, and argued that Bertrand Russell's notion of
scope (logic) offered all that was needed to account for such sentences. But in either case, Kripke argued, nothing important in his account depends on the question (see:
Naming and Necessity p. 6n8, p. 59n22). Whether definite descriptions can be used rigidly or not, they can at least
sometimes be used non-rigidly, but a proper name
can only be used rigidly; the asymmetry, Kripke argues, demonstrates that no definite description could
give the meaning of a proper name—although it might be used to explain
who a name refers to (that is, to "fix the referent" of the name).
There are obvious objections to this line of argument. The grammatically proper name 'Miss America' is non-rigid, and the definite descriptions 'the least natural number' or 'the successor of 1' are always rigid. The grammatical category under which a natural language noun phrase falls fails in general to determine whether or not it is rigid. This is in fact an immediate consequence of a theory of essentialism (advocated by Kripke in
Naming and Necessity, for example). Let S be a member of a natural kind. Suppose T is the set of essential properties for membership in S. Then "the x such that x's essential properties are exactly those in T" is always rigid. This suggests that there may be some semantic feature necessary to determine whether or not a noun phrase rigidly designates. The existence of a general criteria for determination of rigidity is questionable.
Essentialism
In
Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that proper names and certain
natural kind terms—including biological
taxonomy and types of natural substances (most famously, "water" and "H2O") designate rigidly. He argues for a form of
scientific essentialism not unlike Aristotelian essentialism. Essential properties are common to an object in all possible worlds, and so they pick out the same objects in all possible worlds - they rigidly designate.
Causal-Historical Theory of Reference
Proper names rigidly designate for reasons that differ from natural kinds terms. The reason '
Johnny Depp' refers to one particular person in all possible worlds is because some person initially gave the name to him by saying something like "Let's call our baby 'Johnny Depp'". This is called the initial baptism. This usage of 'Johnny Depp' for referring to some particular baby got passed on from person-to-person in a giant Causal theory of reference. That is why everybody calls Johnny Depp 'Johnny Depp'. Johnny's mother passed it onto her friends who passed it onto their friends who passed it onto their friends, and so on.
Necessary Identities
One interesting consequence of Kripke semantics is that identities involving rigid designators are necessary. If water is H2O, then water is
necessarily H2O. Since the terms 'water' and 'H2O' pick out the same object in every possible world, there is no possible world in which 'water' picks out something different from 'H2O'. Therefore, water is necessarily H2O. It is possible, of course, that we are mistaken about the chemical composition of water, but that does not affect the necessity of identities. What is not being claimed is that water is necessarily H2O, but
conditionally,
if water is H2O (though we may not know this, it does not change the fact if it is true), then water is necessarily H2O.
References
See also
es:Designador rígidopt:Designador rígido
Proper Names and Definite Descriptions
The notion of rigid designation was first introduced by
Saul Kripke in the lectures that became
Naming and Necessity, in the course of his argument against
descriptivism theories of reference. At the time of Kripke's lectures, the dominant theories of reference in Analytic philosophy (associated with the theories of
Gottlob Frege and
Bertrand Russell) held that the meaning of sentences involving proper names could be given by substituting a contextually appropriate description for the name. Russell, for example, famously heldRussell, Bertrand, Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,
The Problems of Philosophy, chapter 5 ( online text.) that someone who had never met Otto von Bismarck might know of him as
the first Chancellor of the German Empire, and if so, his statement that (say) "Bismarck was a ruthless politician" should be understood to mean "The first Chancellor of the German Empire was a ruthless politician" (which could in turn be analysed into a series of more basic statements according to the method Russell introduced in his theory of definite descriptions). Kripke argued — against both the Russellian analysis and several attempted refinements of it — that such descriptions could not possibly
mean the same thing as the name "Bismarck," on the grounds that proper names such as "Bismarck" always designate
rigidly, whereas descriptions such as "the first Chancellor of the German Empire" do not. Thus, for example, it
might have been the case that Bismarck died in infancy. If so, he would not have ever satisfied the description "the first Chancellor of the German Empire," and (indeed) someone else probably would have. It does not follow that the first Chancellor of the German Empire may not have been the first Chancellor of the German Empire—that is (at least according to its surface-structure) a contradiction. Kripke argues that the way that proper names
work is that when we make statements about what might or might not have been true of Bismarck, we are talking about what might or might not have been true of
that particular person in various situations, whereas when we make statements about what might or might not have been true of, say,
the first Chancellor of the German Empire we
could be talking about what might or might not have been true of
whomever would have happened to fill that office in those situations.
The "could" here is important to note: rigid designation is a property of the
way terms are used, not a property of
the terms themselves, and some philosophers, following
Keith Donnellan, have argued that a phrase such as "the first Chancellor of the German Empire"
could be used rigidly, in sentences such as "the first Chancellor of the German Empire could have decided never to go into politics." Kripke himself doubted that there was any need to recognize rigid uses of definite descriptions, and argued that
Bertrand Russell's notion of scope (logic) offered all that was needed to account for such sentences. But in either case, Kripke argued, nothing important in his account depends on the question (see:
Naming and Necessity p. 6n8, p. 59n22). Whether definite descriptions can be used rigidly or not, they can at least
sometimes be used non-rigidly, but a proper name
can only be used rigidly; the asymmetry, Kripke argues, demonstrates that no definite description could
give the meaning of a proper name—although it might be used to explain
who a name refers to (that is, to "fix the referent" of the name).
There are obvious objections to this line of argument. The grammatically proper name 'Miss America' is non-rigid, and the definite descriptions 'the least natural number' or 'the successor of 1' are always rigid. The grammatical category under which a natural language noun phrase falls fails in general to determine whether or not it is rigid. This is in fact an immediate consequence of a theory of essentialism (advocated by Kripke in
Naming and Necessity, for example). Let S be a member of a natural kind. Suppose T is the set of essential properties for membership in S. Then "the x such that x's essential properties are exactly those in T" is always rigid. This suggests that there may be some semantic feature necessary to determine whether or not a noun phrase rigidly designates. The existence of a general criteria for determination of rigidity is questionable.
Essentialism
In
Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that
proper names and certain natural kind terms—including biological
taxonomy and types of natural substances (most famously, "water" and "H2O") designate rigidly. He argues for a form of scientific essentialism not unlike Aristotelian essentialism. Essential properties are common to an object in all possible worlds, and so they pick out the same objects in all possible worlds - they rigidly designate.
Causal-Historical Theory of Reference
Proper names rigidly designate for reasons that differ from natural kinds terms. The reason '
Johnny Depp' refers to one particular person in all possible worlds is because some person initially gave the name to him by saying something like "Let's call our baby 'Johnny Depp'". This is called the initial baptism. This usage of 'Johnny Depp' for referring to some particular baby got passed on from person-to-person in a giant
Causal theory of reference. That is why everybody calls Johnny Depp 'Johnny Depp'. Johnny's mother passed it onto her friends who passed it onto their friends who passed it onto their friends, and so on.
Necessary Identities
One interesting consequence of Kripke semantics is that identities involving rigid designators are necessary. If
water is H2O, then water is
necessarily H2O. Since the terms 'water' and 'H2O' pick out the same object in every possible world, there is no possible world in which 'water' picks out something different from 'H2O'. Therefore, water is necessarily H2O. It is possible, of course, that we are mistaken about the chemical composition of water, but that does not affect the necessity of identities. What is not being claimed is that water is necessarily H2O, but
conditionally,
if water is H2O (though we may not know this, it does not change the fact if it is true), then water is necessarily H2O.
References
See also
es:Designador rígidopt:Designador rígido
Rigid designator - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designator when it designates (picks out, denotes, refers to) the same thing in all possible worlds in ...
rigid designator definition - Dictionary - MSN Encarta
rig·id des·ig·na·tor (plural rig·id des·ig·na·tors) noun : Definition: proper name not description: in philosophy, a name that stands for the same thing in every possible ...
Non-rigid designator - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the philosophy of language and modal logic, a non-rigid designator (or flaccid designator) is a term that does not extensionally refer to the same object in all possible worlds.
Google Dictionary:rigid designator in English
Google's free online dictionary service. ... No dictionary translations were found for: rigid designator in Spanish
Google Dictionary:rigid designator in Spanish
Google's free online dictionary service. ... Web definitions. In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designator when it designates (picks out ...
rigid designator from FOLDOC
rigid designator < philosophical terminology > an expression that refers to the same thing in every possible world. According to Saul Kripke, proper names and terms that signify ...
rigid designator - OneLook Dictionary Search
We found 5 dictionaries with English definitions that include the word rigid designator: Tip: Click on the first link on a line below to go directly to a page where "rigid ...
Google Dictionary:rigid designator in English
Google's free online dictionary service. ... rigid designator Web definitions. In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designator when it ...
Philosophical Dictionary: Relativism-Ryle
rigid designator. An expression that refers to the same thing in every possible world. According to Saul Kripke, proper names and terms that signify natural kinds (unlike definite ...
rigid designator: Definition from Answers.com
rigid designator A rigid designator is one that denotes the same thing in all possible worlds, or in all possible worlds in which that thing exists
